To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of firm-level corporate income tax expenses to date. We use publicly available financial statement information to estimate firm-level effective tax rates (ETRs) for 10,642 corporations from 85 countries from 1988 to 2007. We find that multinationals and domestic-only companies face similar ETRs. We also find that, on average, ETRs declined by seven percentage points or 20% over the period. German, Japanese, Australian and Canadian decreases were large. American, British, and French declines were more modest. Nonetheless, because ETRs were falling worldwide, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries changed little. Japanese firms always faced the highest ETRs. ETRs for tax havens and countries from the Middle East and Asia (ignoring Japan) were always lower than those for the U.S. and European countries. These findings should provide some empirical underpinning for ongoing policy debates about the taxation of multinational profits.
Introduction
This paper estimates country-level effective tax rates (ETRs) using financial statement information from 10,642 corporations domiciled in 85 countries and having subsidiaries in 195 countries from 1988 to 2007. 1 The purpose of this study is to illuminate an ongoing worldwide debate about the taxation of international commerce. At the beginning of our investigation period (1988) , the taxation of multinationals was an obscure area of the law, understood by few practitioners, rarely mentioned in policy circles, and largely ignored by academe. Today, globalization has made the taxation of international commerce relevant to most businesses, central to policy discussions about jobs, trade, and competitiveness, and an area of interest to scholars in accounting, economics, finance, law, and related fields.
These ETRs enable us to compare within and across countries the taxes faced by multinationals and domestic-only firms and to assess the extent to which the domicile of foreign subsidiaries affects the worldwide tax expense of multinationals. Tests are conducted across years and industries.
International tax policy changes are being proposed and implemented around the globe.
In December, 2008, the UK and Japan decided to revamp their international tax law by shifting from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. 2 1 By "domicile," we mean the location of the firm for tax purposes. There is no standard definition of domicile. For example, domicile is the legal residence or site of incorporation in the U.S., but the location of operational headquarters in the UK.
In the same month, an advisory panel formed by the Canadian Minister of Finance recommended multinational-friendly changes to its international tax law (see Advisory Panel on Canada's System of International Taxation, 2008). 2 In overly simplistic terms, countries with territorial systems only tax the domestic income of companies domiciled in their country. In contrast, countries with worldwide systems tax all income (domestic and foreign) of their home companies and provide foreign tax credits to prevent double taxation of foreign profits.
All three countries claimed to be attempting to enhance the competitiveness of their multinationals.
In May, 2009, the Obama Administration took a different course, proposing controversial changes that would strengthen the U.S. worldwide tax system. These proposals follow years of debate over whether longstanding American policy toward the taxation of international business is in the best interest of the country (see United States House of Representatives (2007) This paper examines tax information from the financial statements to provide some empirical underpinning for these important policy discussions. Although we recognize that numerous economic, social, and political forces have motivated the need for this documentation, it is beyond the scope of this paper to list the many changes in investment, technology, trade, and labor that have accelerated the development of a global economy and exacerbated the inherent difficulty that any single government faces in attempting to tax companies that service these multinational markets. Furthermore, it also is beyond the scope of this paper to detail how countries have revised their tax laws in recent years to continue to collect revenue while maintaining or increasing their share of the global economy, to list the numerous tax plans devised in response to these legislative changes, to discuss the difficulties of communicating this complex area of tax law in the political arena, or to review the literature of international tax research in accounting, economics, finance and law. Instead, we will mention a few recent events concerning the taxation of multinationals that should suffice for demonstrating the current, unprecedented interest in multinational taxation and the contribution that this study makes in providing some empirical facts about the extent to which the domicile of a company affects the taxes that it pays.
To start, U.S. President Barack Obama ran on a tax plan that included "…reforming deferral to end the incentive for companies to ship jobs overseas."
(http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf). His election spurred months of heated debate about the possible elimination of the deferral of U.S. taxes on foreign profits until dividend repatriation (Weiner, 2009) . 3 On May 4, 2009, when the White House put forth a formal proposal, which calls for deferring some deductions until repatriation and curbing the "check the box" regulations that enable multinationals to structure their foreign operations in a tax-favorable manner, President Obama justified the changes, saying "I want to see our companies remain the most competitive in the world. But the way to make sure that happens is not to reward our companies for moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax havens." Ignoring the merits of the controversial proposed changes, Obama-type policy statements imply that multinationals somehow benefit unfairly from a tax system with perverse incentives. 4 In contrast, the managers of many U.S. multinationals assert that the U.S. tax system places them at a competitive disadvantage compared with multinationals in other countries.
They point to the relatively high U.S. statutory tax rate as evidence of the competitive disadvantage.
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Meanwhile, during much of 2008, British firms were not just complaining about the tax system, they were abandoning it for domiciles with more favorable tax treatment (The Economist, 2008) . The Henderson Group, Charter, Shire, WPP, and the United Business Media emigrated to Ireland and the Regus Group to Luxembourg reportedly to escape high taxes on foreign profits for multinationals domiciled in the UK (Werdigier, 2008 and Faith, 2008) .
Kingfisher, Brit Insurance, RSA Insurance, and Prudential, among others, threatened to leave (Werdigier, 2008 , Braithwaite, 2008 . In fact, the Financial Times (September 21, 2008 ) quoted an anonymous source saying, "As we understand it, half the FTSE 100 is looking at this [redomiciling outside the UK.]." (Braithwaite, 2008) .
They call for reform of the U.S. taxation of multinational profits to reflect current global business conditions, although no consensus exists in the business community about the changes that should be made. Furthermore, consistent with claims that companies domiciled outside the U.S. enjoy more favorable tax conditions (at least for their American operations), the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2008) recently concluded that U.S. companies owned by foreigners pay less U.S. tax than do U.S. companies controlled by Americans.
One of those exited British firms is Invesco, which moved its domicile to Bermuda (a tax haven) in December 2007. It was explicit about the influence of international tax considerations.
Although the S&P 500 company is headquartered in Atlanta, it moved its domicile to Bermuda, 5 In the September 26, 2008, U.S. Presidential debate, Republican Presidential candidate Senator John McCain expressed these views about statutory tax rates, stating "Right now, American business pays the second-highest business taxes in the world, 35 percent. Ireland pays 11 percent. Now, if you're a business person, and you can locate any place in the world, then, obviously, if you go to the country where it's 11 percent tax versus 35 percent, you're going to be able to create jobs, increase your business, make more investment, et cetera. I want to cut that business tax. I want to cut it so that businesses will remain in-in the United States of America and create jobs." His opponent, Senator Barack Obama, countered, "Now, John mentioned the fact that business taxes on paper are high in this country, and he's absolutely right. Here's the problem: There are so many loopholes that have been written into the tax code, oftentimes with support of Senator McCain, that we actually see our businesses pay effectively one of the lowest tax rates in the world." rather than the U.S. According to Invesco's Chief Administrative Officer, Colin Meadows, "…we wanted to make sure the transaction in moving our domicile was tax neutral for our shareholders. Moving to the U.S. would not have been a tax neutral situation. When it came down to it, it was a very short list of places that we considered and Bermuda was at the top." (Neil, 2007) .
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The recent British departures may be receiving undue attention in the same way that a few American inversions (reincorporations in low-tax countries with no operational impact) several years ago became highly controversial (in particular, Stanley Works' aborted move to Bermuda in 2002). 7 The more significant losses (both in number and pounds) may be those newly formed companies that in the past would have established their headquarters in the UK but instead are domiciling (for tax purposes) outside the UK from their inception. Since these "departures" are unobservable, they mainly escape attention, though their impact may be larger and longer-lasting. Furthermore, some companies already domiciled in (perceived to be) taxdisfavored countries, such as the UK and the U.S., claim that they wish that they had never incorporated there and would leave, except for the high tax, political and other costs of exiting. 8 6 Interestingly, Invesco has 5,500 employees in 19 countries, but neither office nor employees in Bermuda. Desai (2008) discusses this increasingly common separation of a multinational's headquarters, tax domicile, and operations, which he terms the decentering of the global firm. In this paper, we may miscode a country's domicile (i.e., tax home) if its domicile differs from the location provided in the company's financial records. 7 See Desai and Hines (2002) and Voget (2008) for detailed discussions of inversions. Capturing the fiery rhetoric in 2002 concerning U.S. inversions, Johnston (2002) reported, "Senior senators from both parties used blunt language today to denounce companies that use Bermuda as a mail drop to reduce their American income taxes by tens of millions of dollars, calling them 'greedy' and 'unpatriotic' tax evaders whose actions could not be tolerated 'in a time of war'." 8 Their ongoing dissatisfaction is reminiscent of the testimony of Bob Perlman, Vice President of Taxes for Intel Corporation, before the Senate Finance Committee in March, 1999, where he stated, "…if I had known at Intel's founding (over thirty years ago) what I know today about the international tax rules, I would have advised that the parent company be established outside the U.S. This reflects the reality that our Tax Code competitively disadvantages multinationals simply because the parent is a U.S. corporation." (Perlman, 1999 (Tuerff, et al., 2008, p.79 ).
Other countries have recently followed the Dutch lead. In late 2008, both the British and Japanese governments moved to exempt dividends paid from foreign subsidiaries from home country corporate income taxes. The changes shift both countries from a worldwide system of taxation to a territorial system, leaving the U.S. as the only major country with a worldwide system.
In the UK case, the Treasury stated that "The policy objective is to enhance the competitiveness of the UK by providing the widest possible exemption." Chris Morgan of KPMG called the proposal, "…a decisive shift towards a territorial tax system where the UK only taxes profits made in the UK." However, Ian Brimicombe, head of tax at AstraZeneca, doubted that the change in the law would bring back the firms that had already exited the UK and noted that companies with intellectual property or finance subsidiaries were still disadvantaged in the UK. (Houlder, 2008 were falling for all countries, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries changed little. We also find evidence that the location of a foreign subsidiary may have some effect, though limited, on a multinational's worldwide tax burden.
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international firm-level corporate income tax burdens to date. Collins and Shackelford (1995) studied parent ETRs for four countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) and ten years (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) . Their subsequent study, Collins and Shackelford (2003) , added Germany and investigated ETRs from 1992-1997; however, with data for only eight Japanese firm-years and 36 German firm-years, they were effectively limited to studying three countries. In both studies, they conclude that the parents of multinationals domiciled in the U.S. and the UK faced similar ETRs, both of which exceeded the parent ETRs in Canada. In neither study did they have information about the location of the company's subsidiaries. Recent advances in computer-readable financial statement datasets enable us to study far more companies (both at the parent and subsidiary level), countries, and years than Collins and Shackelford could study.
Two other studies have compared ETRs across countries. Lu and Swenson (2000) and Lee and Swenson (2008) This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the regression equation used to estimate the ETRs. Section 3 details the sample selection. Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the empirical findings. Closing remarks follow.
Regression Equation
To compare the tax rates of multinationals and domestic firms across countries and to determine whether multinationals and domestics in the same country face different tax rates, we estimate a modified version of the pooled, cross-sectional regression equation developed in Collins and Shackelford (1995) The ETRs are collected from each firm's financial statements.
14 11 To estimate equation (1), one industry and one year have to be excluded from the regression. To determine which industry to leave out, we calculate the mean ETR in each industry (two-digit NAICS) and then determine the median of those means. The industry with the median mean (code 31) is the one left out. We implement a similar procedure on the years, resulting in 2005 being the excluded year. To improve comparability across estimations, we exclude the same industry and year from each regression.
The numerator for the ETR computation is the total worldwide income tax expense in the company's publicly available financial statements. In subsequent tests, the numerator is current income tax expense.
12 Note that the magnitude of the domestic and multinational ETRs cannot be directly compared with the actual ETRs from the financial statements, which serve as the dependent variable. The domestic and multinational ETRs are the tax rates, conditional on industry, year, and size. That said, our empirical analysis shows that the estimated ETRs are very similar to the actual ETRs from the financial statements. 13 We use percentile ranks rather than actual values or logarithms to mitigate concerns about the accuracy of the foreign exchange and unit data. We converted all dollar variables to millions of U.S. dollars using the currency and unit data in the database. However, there appear to be errors in the data for a few countries, e.g., some of the Italian data, which the database claims is expressed in Euros, appear to be expressed in Italian Lira. Also in a few cases, data appear to be expressed in thousands although the database asserts that they are expressed in millions. By using percentile ranks, we limit the impact of these possible errors on our size controls. 14 Note that the ETRs in this study are not marginal tax rates, as detailed in Scholes, et al., 2009 . They ignore implicit taxes, cannot assess who bears the burden of corporate income taxes, and cannot capture incentives to employ new capital (see Fullerton, 1980, and Bradford and Fullerton, 1981 , for a discussion of marginal effective tax rates). Neither are they the tax rates related to investment decisions developed in Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Gordon, et al (2003) .
Unfortunately, unlike U.S. GAAP, the GAAP in many countries do not require firms to disclose the current income tax expense. Thus, many companies in our study do not report their current income tax expense. Nonetheless, for those companies that report both figures, inferences are the same whether we use total or current income tax expense. Thus, to conduct our primary tests, we use the total income tax expense because it is available for more firms.
The ETR denominator is net income before income taxes (NIBT). Since financial reporting rules vary across countries and thus affect the computation of NIBT, we conduct sensitivity tests using total revenues and an adjusted net income as denominators. 15 Results are qualitatively the same.
Sample
We use the Osiris database to collect a sample of firms for this study. 16 To collect information about the parents for all firm-years between 1988 and 2007, we access the data through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) interface.
17 15 To test the sensitivity of our findings to the selection of NIBT as the scalar, we use two other profit measures to scale the total income tax expense: adjusted net income (NIBT plus certain key expenses) and revenues. Adjusted net income is intended to add back two key expenses whose accounting rules vary across countries, namely depreciation expense and research and development expense. The second scalar, revenues, eliminates any crosscountry variation in expenses.
We attempt to mitigate the impact of outliers and errors in the data by deleting all observations for which any one of the following are true: (a) ETR exceeds 70%, (b) ETR is negative, (c) the ratio of total income tax expense to a modification of NIBT (adding back depreciation and research and development 16 Although the number of financial statement variables tracked in Osiris is smaller than that tracked in Compustat Global, the Osiris database is superior for this study because it allows us to identify the countries in which firms have subsidiaries. 17 The data used in this study were last updated February 13, 2008. Because very few December year-end firms would have reported by that time, the number of observations for 2007 is smaller than those for the earlier years. expense) is negative or exceeds 70%.
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Information about the subsidiaries of these firms is accessed through an Internet interface with Bureau van Dijk.
We also eliminate firm-years with (a) missing values for firm identifier (os_id_number), sales (data13002), tax expense (data13035), and NIBT (data13034), (b) nonpositive sales, and (c) negative values for depreciation, and research and development expenses. All missing values for depreciation and research and development expense are set to zero. We also delete all observations where NIBT plus depreciation and research and development expense equals zero. 19 We obtain information about subsidiaries classified in levels 1 through 10. 20 Thus, if a firm has a domestic subsidiary (level 1), which has a domestic subsidiary (level 2), which has a domestic subsidiary (level 3) and so forth until the domestic subsidiary in level 9 has a foreign subsidiary (level 10), we would treat that firm as a multinational and code that country as having a foreign subsidiary. Foreign subsidiaries buried beneath ten layers of domestic subsidiaries will be miscoded, but we doubt that this data limitation will have any effect on the paper's inferences.
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The Osiris subsidiary measure has a serious flaw. Osiris only reports the subsidiary information as of the most recent updating of the information.
22
18 Inferences are unchanged when we further control for the effects of outliers by deleting from each specification any observations that are identified as outliers by Cook's D, studentized residuals, or DFFITS.
We are unable to assess the 19 Bureau van Dijk collects information directly from Annual Reports and other filings. In addition, it obtains information from several information providers, including CFI Online (Ireland), Dun & Bradstreet, Datamonitor, Factset, LexisNexis, and Worldbox. 20 Over two-thirds of the firms reported having zero subsidiaries. We crosschecked this information to public filings of a sample of Canadian and U.S. firms and determined that several of these firms had subsidiaries. Because accurate identification of domestic and multinational firms is central to our study, we discarded the subsidiary information of the 28,427 parent firms that reported having zero subsidiaries. We then code any firm that reports at least one foreign subsidiary as multinational and those that report zero foreign subsidiaries as domestic. 21 We obtain subsidiary information up to level 10 for parents domiciled everywhere, except Canada, New York, and North Carolina. For unresolved reasons, we were only able to obtain level 1 subsidiary information for firms domiciled in these jurisdictions. Inferences are unchanged when we drop firm-years from these jurisdictions from our sample. 22 For example, if a company had no subsidiary in Canada before 2007 (the most recent year in the database) and then incorporated a subsidiary in Canada in 2007, we would erroneously treat the company as having had a extent to which this data limitation affects the conclusions drawn from this study. However, to mitigate the potential for miscoding the existence and location of foreign subsidiaries, we limit the primary tests in this paper to firm-years since 2002.
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Our sample selection process yields a main sample of 27,136 firm-years spanning 85 countries, ranging from only one firm-year in seven countries to 7,177 in the U.S. We combine the countries with the fewest observations based on geography and other characteristics, leaving nine large countries: Australia 24 (5% of the sample), Canada (3%), China (3%), France (1%), Germany (1%), India (2%), Japan (24%), the UK (8%) and the U.S.(26%).
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Canadian subsidiary for all years in our sample. Likewise, if a company had a subsidiary in Canada for all years before 2007 and then liquidated the Canadian subsidiary in 2006, we would erroneously treat the company as not having had a subsidiary in Canada for any year in our sample.
Because of a similar history of economic development, we form a group with the four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan-12% of the sample). We form another group 23 Another advantage of limiting the analysis to recent years is that it mitigates potential survivorship bias. The Osiris database is limited to companies presently in existence. Thus, our analysis is limited to firms that have survived throughout the investigation period. By restricting the sample to firm-years since 2002, we reduce the deleterious effects of survivorship bias. 24 We include New Zealand with Australia because New Zealand does not fit in any of the geographic groups described below, does not meet the criteria to be included on its own, and the corporate income tax systems of the two countries are largely similar. In our main sample, we have 1,138 Australia parent firm-years and 96 New Zealand parent firm-years. 25 The large countries were selected based on the size of their economy and the number of their firm-years. These nine countries were the only ones with gross domestic product in excess of one trillion dollars in In general, the four tax rate columns paint a similar picture. Countries with high statutory tax rates tend to have high ETR, whether they are measured in the aggregate or at the firm level.
One notable exception is multinationals domiciled in tax havens. They face the lowest statutory rates in the study. However, their ETRs are much higher, albeit less than those in most other countries. This discrepancy between statutory and effective tax rates is consistent with multinationals in tax havens having extensive foreign operations in high-tax countries. Even though they face low taxes on their domestic income, they must pay higher taxes abroad.
The numbers reported are the weighted average rates, where the weighting was done by number of firm-years. In the full sample, domestics and multinationals faced identical average statutory tax rates of 38%. The first column in Table 2 reports the actual ETRs from the financial statements. The second column reports the ETRs from estimating equation (1). 31 There is little difference between the two columns. 32 We infer from the similarity between the actual and estimated ETRs that the control variables (for industry, year and size) have little impact on the coefficients of interest. This pattern holds throughout the paper, suggesting that the inferences drawn in this study would be similar whether we used the actual ETRs from the financial statements or the ETRs estimated in the regression. For brevity, we will focus exclusively on the estimated ETRs in the remainder of the paper.
Results from Comparing Domestic-only Firms with Multinationals

Actual vs. Estimated ETRs
Comparing the tax burdens of domestic-only firms across countries
The ETRs in (i.e., the remaining European countries, which are grouped together). This order will hold throughout the study, i.e., the U.S. domestic ETR will be above average, similar to those of the UK and European countries, but well below that of Japan. Furthermore, ignoring Japan's high rates, the Asian ETRs will be less than the American and European ETRs. In fact, all of the domestic ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe will exceed those for China, India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia (i.e., the remaining Asian countries) for most of the tests in the paper.
Comparing the tax burdens of multinationals across countries
The ETRs in Interestingly, four of the five groups whose domestics face statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) higher ETRs compared with their multinational counterparts are Asian (India (5%), China (4%), Asian Tigers (3%) and Japan (3%)). 33 The other one is Europe (3%). The U.S. is the only country whose multinational ETR is significantly greater than its domestic ETR.
However, the difference is only 1%, leading us to conclude that American domestics and multinationals face similar ETRs.
Comparisons using the Current Income Tax Expense
The numerator in our computation of ETR, the total income tax expense, is the tax expense on current profits, regardless of whether those taxes were paid in the past, are paid in the current year, or will be paid in the future. The current income tax expense includes only that portion of the total income tax expense related to taxes that will be paid in the current year.
Thus, current income tax expense should be a better numerator than total income tax expense for our measure of ETRs.
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Unfortunately, Osiris does not collect the current income tax expense. However, Compustat Global does collect it. Thus, to test the sensitivity of our inferences to the use of the total income tax expense, we merge the Osiris and Compustat Global databases to create a 33 A possible explanation for the lower ETR of Indian multinationals as compared to Indian domestic-only firms is that India has granted extended tax holidays to software firms over our sample period. 19% of the Indian firm-years in our sample are in the Computer Programming industry (NAICS 5415). All other industries, except Biotech Manufacturing (NAICS 3254) at 12%, represent less than 5% of the sample. We thank Mihir Desai for bringing this information to our attention. We look forward to future research that details similarly rich industry-level differences that explain some of the differences in the domestic and multinational ETRs of other countries. 34 See Hanlon (2003) for a detailed discussion of both the total and current income tax expenses and problems associated with using either of them to approximate actual taxes paid.
matched sample of 9,185 firm-years from 2003-2007 for whom data are available in both databases. 35 We then estimate equation (1) using the matched sample and the current income tax expense. The regression coefficient estimates for COUNTRY and COUNTRY*MN will enable us to compare domestic and multinational ETRs across countries and within countries and thus assess whether the inferences, reached using the total income tax expense, hold when we use the current income tax expense.
36
The third column in Table 2 Compustat Global has acknowledged this error but has not corrected it. Consequently, we drop all firm-years from the problematic countries from our sample. Compustat Global has another shortcoming for purposes of this study. In particular, it has no foreign subsidiary information. The only item in the Compustat Global database that indicates any foreign activity is foreign tax expense. Unfortunately, accounting rules vary across countries in the reporting of foreign income tax expense, rendering cross-country comparisons based on foreign tax expense problematic. In addition, no foreign income tax expense will be reported by companies that owe no foreign tax, even if they have extensive foreign activities. To illustrate this shortcoming, 678 (30%) of the 2,276 firm-years in our matched sample in 2006 (the year in which we have the most confidence in our procedure for identifying multinationals using Osiris data) are classified differently (and we believe erroneously) when we rely on the presence of foreign income tax expense in Compustat Global to identify multinationals. 36 To establish comparability between the two samples, we first estimate equation (1) with the smaller, matched sample, but continuing to use the total income tax expense in the numerator of the ETR measure. We find that the inferences drawn from this regression are similar to the ones drawn from the full sample using total income tax expense. This provides confidence that any difference between the findings using total income tax expense in the numerator and those using current income tax expense in the numerator does not arise from sample differences.
We find that our high-tax to low-tax rankings are largely indifferent to whether the ETR numerator is total or current income tax expense.
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In summary, the ETRs and the relative rank of the countries are largely unaffected by whether the numerator in the ETR calculation is total income tax expense or current income tax expense. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, we will use the sample with total income tax expense as the numerator because it triples the sample that uses the current income tax expense.
Japan's current domestic (multinational)
ETR remains substantially higher than any other country's ETR at 38% (35%). The group with the next highest ETR is Europe (Germany) at 32% (30%). With no domestic estimates for the Middle East or Tax Havens, the Asian Tigers and Latin America share the lowest domestic ETR at 17%. China has the lowest multinational ETR (14%). Ignoring Japan, all of the Asian ETRs continue to be less than the American and European ETRs.
Comparisons using all Firm-Years from 1988-2007
As discussed above, we exclude pre-2003 firm-years because the Osiris foreign subsidiary information, which we use to identify multinationals, is only coded for the most recent Osiris update. Since we do not know when a firm formed its first foreign subsidiary, using all firm-years undoubtedly results in miscoding some domestic-only firm-years as multinational firm-years.
To find out if this miscoding of firm-years before 2003 affects the high-tax to low-tax ranking among the countries in our study, we estimate equation (1) including all firm-years for which we have data. This adds 41,737 firm-years to our sample. The last column in Table 2 shows the resulting estimated ETRs.
37 Consistent with deferred tax liabilities generally exceeding deferred tax assets, the coefficient estimates for the ETRs computed with total income tax expense in the numerator exceed the coefficient estimates for the ETRs computed with current income tax expense in the numerator in 20 of the 25 cases in the third column of Table 2 .
Despite this substantial increase in observations and the inevitable miscoding of multinationals introduced by adding the earlier firm-years and the potential survivorship bias noted above, the inferences are largely unaltered. The rank order of the countries remains qualitatively unaltered: the Japanese domestic (multinational) ETR is 38% (37%), nine (five)
percentage points greater than that for France (Germany), the country with next highest ETR.
The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETR is the lowest at 11% (12%), seven (two)
percentage points below those of China and Latin America (Tax Havens). Once again, the U.S.
and European countries generally have higher ETRs than Asian countries. All of the domestic and multinational ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for China, India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia. In short, the high-tax to low-tax rankings are 
Year-by-year comparisons from 1988 to 2007
The previous section establishes that the estimates of equation (1) are substantially the same whether the sample is drawn from recent years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) or from the entire investigation period (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . In this section we report annual estimated ETRs, using the complete sample of firm-years to estimate equation (1) 38 Though beyond the scope of this study, Japan's remarkable ability to sustain substantially higher tax rates than its trading partners throughout two decades warrants further investigation. Ishi (2001) and Griffith and Klemm (2004) (among others) document the gap, but we are aware of no study that attempts to ascertain the reasons why the gap has persisted for such a long period. 
Comparisons Across Industries
To assess whether ETRs vary across industries, we estimate equation (1) 
Additional Tests
The data enable us to conduct a battery of additional tests and robustness checks, which we discuss briefly in this section. In every case, the inferences drawn above hold.
One, it is difficult to determine where the profits generated from intangible assets are earned. As a result, firms with large amounts of intangible assets may be better able to avoid taxes (see discussions in Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme, 2008 , Mutti and Grubert, 2007 , and Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006 , among many others). To assess whether firms with greater amounts of intangibles have lower ETRs, we would ideally sort firms based on their levels of intangible assets. Unfortunately, information about the amount of intangible assets is not publicly available. Thus, we turn to an observable figure, total research and development expenses, which, we assume, is positively correlated with the firm's level of intangibles.
We estimate equation (1) for those firm-years with positive values for research and development expenses, modifying the equation to include a categorical variable for those firmyears where research and development expenses as a percentage of total assets are above the median. Consistent with high intangible firms having lower ETRs, we find that the coefficient on the categorical variable is -2.6% and highly significant.
Two, as mentioned above, many countries have shifted from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Furthermore, Japan and the U.K. are in the process of moving to a territorial system, leaving the U.S. as the sole remaining major worldwide country. Some have conjectured that a territorial system in the U.S. would collect less revenue than the current worldwide system. To test the impact of a worldwide system on ETRs, we estimate equation (1), after adding a categorical variable equal to one if the parent country has a worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise. We find that the worldwide coefficient is insignificant.
Three, in countries with imputation, the corporate income tax serves as a form of withholding tax because the corporate tax (or some part of it) can be used to offset shareholders' dividend taxes. Thus, it is possible that corporate tax planning is less important in imputation countries because firms in those countries have less incentive to lower their ETRs than those do in classical systems, such as the U.S., where corporate taxes do not offset shareholder taxes. We test this possibility by modifying equation (1) to include a categorical variable that indicates whether the firm is domiciled in a country with any form of imputation. We find that the estimated coefficient on the imputation variable is 6% and significant at the 1% level, consistent with imputation countries facing higher ETRs.
Four, to assess the impact of cross-country differences in book and tax accounting on our estimates of cross-country ETRs, we use Atwood, Drake and Myers' (2009) book-tax conformity measure (BTC) for 33 countries from 1993 to 2005. Consistent with book-tax conformity mattering, we find a positive correlation between BTC and the absolute value of the difference between a firm's maximum statutory tax rate and its ETR. However, when we modify equation
(1) to include the BTC measure, we find that the coefficient on the BTC measure is insignificant.
This failure to detect a relation between a measure of book-tax conformity and the level of ETRs provides some comfort that the inferences drawn from this study are not solely an artifact of cross-country differences in financial reporting.
Five, another cross-country difference is whether tax losses can be carried back to offset the prior year's taxable income. 40 When we add a categorical variable indicating whether a country permits losses to be carried back, we find that the coefficient on that variable is -2.5% and significant at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with lower ETRs in countries that permit firms to carry back their losses.
41
Six, the corporate income tax is only one of many taxes, and in many countries, it is a relatively minor source of government revenue. To the extent countries rely on alternative taxes, they may need less revenue from corporate income taxes, which are the sole tax used to compute ETRs. Alternatively, high income tax countries may levy high taxes across the board.
Consistent with a trade-off among revenue sources, we find that the value-added tax rate is negatively correlated with ETRs.
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Seven, we include the maximum statutory corporate income tax rate in equation (1). As would be expected, we find a positive coefficient on the statutory rate. However, the relative ranks of the sixteen countries/groups' multinationals, remain largely unchanged with Japan (Middle East) retaining the top (bottom) rank. This implies that the ETRs are driven by differences in both tax rates and tax bases.
However, when we exclude companies domiciled in the U.S.
(the only major country without a value-added tax), the correlation becomes positive, consistent with countries that have high corporate income taxes also having high value-added taxes. To determine whether the value-added tax affects the inferences drawn above, we include the valueadded tax rate in equation (1). Inferences are unaltered.
Eight, the sample excludes all firm-years with losses (i.e., negative NIBT). In this sensitivity test, we add back the 3,297 firm-years with losses and actual ETRs (from the financial statements) that equal zero and estimate equation (1). By definition, adding these loss firm-years lowers the estimated ETRs. We find that the inclusion of loss firm-years has inconsequential impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese domestic (multinational) ETRs remain the highest by far at 31% (26%), ten (five) percentage points above the German ETRs. The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETRs are the lowest at 5%
(4%), five (three) percentage points below the Tax Havens. All of the multinational ETRs for 42 We thank Kevin Hassett for providing us with the valued-add tax data.
France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for China, India, and the Asian Tigers.
Nine, the sample includes firm-years with zero ETRs as long as their NIBT was positive.
In this robustness check, we drop those 1,058 firm-years with non-positive ETRs as reported in the financial statements. By definition, eliminating these zero ETR firms increases the estimated ETRs. We find that the deletion of non-positive ETRs has inconsequential impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese domestic (multinational) ETRs are 40% (38%), twelve (six) percentage points above those for Germany, the country with the next highest ETR. The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETRs are the lowest at 12% (13%), eight (four) percentage points ahead of the Tax Havens. Once again, the U.S. and European countries generally have higher ETRs than Asian countries. All of the domestic and multinational ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for China, India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia.
All in all, we conclude from this series of additional tests that the earlier inferences about ETRs hold. The remainder of the paper expands the domestic-multinational dichotomy to consider whether the domiciles of foreign subsidiaries affect ETRs.
Results from Comparing Foreign Subsidiaries
Cross-country comparisons
In Equation (1), we use the presence of a foreign subsidiary to distinguish multinationals from domestic-only firms. In this section, we replace that single categorical variable with categorical variables for all locations of foreign subsidiaries. The coefficients on the foreign subsidiary variables enable us to assess the extent to which the location of a foreign subsidiary affects the tax burdens of its parent. The regression equation is:
where: an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports a subsidiary in country k, equal to 0 otherwise.
All other variables are defined the same as in equation (1). The estimated regression coefficient on SUB is the estimated impact on ETRs arising from having a subsidiary in that foreign country.
We continue to use the same 16 groups as in the previous section. Each group serves as a COUNTRY variable and a SUB variable. Each firm-year has one country in which its COUNTRY variable is coded one. However, it has n SUBs coded one, where n is the number of different countries in which the parent has at least one subsidiary.
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We begin with the original sample of 27,136 firm-years (from 2003-2007) with total income tax expense as the numerator for the ETR. We lose 167 firm-years whose companies indicated that they had a foreign subsidiary (which was adequate for coding it as a multinational in estimating equation (1)), but did not specify the location of the foreign subsidiary, rendering it unusable for estimating equation (2). For these remaining 26,969 firm-years, there are 57,966
SUB variables with a value of one. All 16 subsidiary locations have at least 1,200 firm-years.
Europe is the most popular location for foreign subsidiaries with 6,335 firm-years. coefficients from equation (1), except to the extent that identifying the location of a firm's foreign subsidiaries, as opposed to just identifying the existence of a foreign subsidiary provides information. It seems plausible that knowing the subsidiary's domicile would affect inferences because foreign subsidiaries are not randomly distributed across parents. Multinationals from some countries might be more likely to have profitable foreign investments or operate in high-tax countries (e.g., French companies are more likely to have a subsidiary in high-tax Germany than are Indian companies, which might account for some of the higher ETRs in France.). That said, we find little evidence that the location of the foreign subsidiary matters. Only two COUNTRY coefficients are more than two percentage points different from the corresponding COUNTRY coefficients in Table 2 . The domestic German ETR decreases from 30% to 27%, while the domestic Indian ETR increases from 20% to 23%.
We now turn our attention to Panel B and the SUB coefficients. We expect cross-country variation in the SUB coefficients to the extent that locating a foreign subsidiary in a country affects the multinational's ETR. For example, if a firm can shift profits from a high-tax country to a tax haven, then its ETR should be lower and the Tax Haven SUB coefficient should reflect those tax savings. To our surprise, we find little evidence of cross-country variation in SUB coefficients. The SUB coefficients range from a 1.3 percentage points decrease in ETRs (Asia) to a 1.2 percentage points increase in ETRs (Australia). The Tax Haven SUB coefficient implies that a firm with at least one subsidiary in a haven country enjoys a 0.5 percentage point lower ETR, negative but hardly a substantial amount.
Parent-subsidiary interactions
The lack of results in the previous section may stem from the fact that foreign subsidiaries affect the ETRs of their parents differently depending on the domicile of the parent.
For example, Australian subsidiaries may lower the high-tax ETRs of Japan parents but increase the low-tax ETRs of Asian Tiger parents. In the prior section, the two effects of Australian subsidiaries would have offset each other, potentially understating the impact of Australian subsidiaries on parent ETRs in both Japan and the Asian Tigers.
In this section, we alter the research design in an attempt to detect any possible parentsubsidiary interactive effects. Specifically, we modify equation (2) by replacing the SUB variables with interactions between the COUNTRY and SUB variables. We then compare the coefficients on the interactions to assess the extent to which subsidiaries affect parents differently, depending on whether the parent is in a high-tax or low-tax country. Table 6 , Panel A presents the estimated interaction coefficients (no coefficients are shown unless there are at least 100 observations in a cell). We would expect that subsidiaries in low-tax countries would lower the ETRs of their parents more than subsidiaries in high-tax countries do. Consistent with this expectations, we find that, across all parents, the subsidiaries from low-tax countries (China, India, Asian Tigers, Tax Havens, Asian and the Middle East) have 30 negative interaction coefficients (indicating a reduction in the parents' ETRs) and only nine positive interaction coefficients (indicating an increase in the parents' ETRs). For example, subsidiaries in Tax Havens reduce ETRs in 7 of the 8 countries with coefficients. Conversely, subsidiaries located in high-tax countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the U.S., and Europe) have 23 negative interaction coefficients and 26 positive interaction coefficients.
The interactive coefficient estimates also allow us to compare domestics in a country with multinationals operating in that country, shedding light on reports, such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (2008) finding that U.S.-controlled U.S. companies pay more taxes than foreign-controlled U.S. companies. Consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (2008) report, we find that U.S. domestics have a higher ETR (26%) than multinationals from every country, except Japan. 44 We find a modest -0.1% coefficient on the Tax Haven subsidiaries of U.S. parents, which is less than Dyreng and Lindsey's (2009) 1.5% estimate, computed using different data and methodology. Nonetheless, both estimates imply that the impact of tax havens on U.S. parents' ETRs is not as substantial as might be implied by some political claims that vast sums of tax revenue are being lost through havens.
We also find that domestics in China, India, and the Asian Tigers face lower ETRs than multinationals from all Western countries.
One explanation for both studies' surprisingly low tax haven estimates is that foreign subsidiaries cluster and thus coefficients cannot be interpreted independently. For examples, if tax havens are always paired with subsidiaries in high-tax locations (e.g., Irish subsidiaries always co-exist with high-tax European subsidiaries), then clustering effects among subsidiaries may understate the importance of tax havens because the tax haven coefficients are capturing some of the high-tax countries' impact on ETRs.
Thorough investigation of the potential effects of clustering on the ETR estimates in this study is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as exploratory work, we augment equation (3) with three-way interaction terms. Because of a limited number of observations, we include only three-way interactions that have as the parent country one of the five groups with the most firmyears (Japan, the UK, the U.S., Asian Tigers, and Europe). 44 To compute the multinational rate, take the domestic ETR and adjust it for the effect of a U.S. subsidiary. For example, the table shows that the Australian domestic ETR is 24% and the Australian parent-U.S. subsidiary is -1.9%. Thus, Australian companies with U.S. subsidiaries have an average ETR of 22.1%, compared with an average U.S. domestic ETR of 26%.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimates of (the coefficient on the two-way interactions) for each of the five countries/groups from estimating equation (4) on the full sample. Our hope is that controlling for three-way interactions will result in more precise twoway interactions. Comparing the estimates in Panel B to those in Panel A, we find that the sign of the two-way interaction coefficients remain the same in 45 of the 54 coefficients. However, some of the coefficients change enough to suggest that controlling for three-way interactions affects the inferences drawn on the two-way interactions. For example, the coefficient on Tax
Haven subsidiaries of U.S. parents (-0.1% in Panel A) decreases to -0.7% in Panel B, providing stronger evidence that tax havens reduce the ETRs of U.S. multinationals even though the amount remains small. Ideally, additional interactions (i.e., four-way, five-way, and so forth) would be included in the regression model. However, insufficient observations limit the extent of such interactions.
We look forward to future work that attempts to grapple with the clustering of foreign subsidiaries and their impact on ETRs.
Closing Remarks
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international firm-level corporate income tax expenses to date. Its findings should aid the development of tax policy by quantifying the effective tax rates faced by multinational corporations around the globe. The ETRs provide an empirical foundation for the heated debates about the taxes paid by multinationals and domestics around the world and should help to balance rhetoric with documented empirical facts.
Our primary findings are:
• Multinationals and domestic-only firms face similar ETRs;
• Japan consistently has much higher ETRs than any other country;
• The U.S. has above-average ETRs;
• Tax havens, and Middle Eastern, and Asian countries (excepting Japan) have below-average ETRs.
• ETRs fell worldwide over the last two decades;
• The average decline in ETRs was about seven percentage points or 20%.
• German, Japanese, Australian and Canadian ETRs fell more than American, British, and French ETRs.
• The ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries remained remarkably constant because all countries reduced their tax burdens.
On this last point, further work is warranted to understand how the tax order of countries has remained so steady over two decades of radical worldwide changes in tax policy, financial reporting, economic development, law, politics, technology, and many other areas. Although tax rates have fallen dramatically over the last 20 years, high-tax countries remain high-tax and lowtax countries remain low-tax. Perhaps globalization permits countries to change their tax systems but forces a herding effect because tax changes in one country reverberate around the globe (see Griffith and Klemm (2005) for a discussion of tax competition among OECD countries). If this is the case, then proposed major international tax changes that would run contrary to current tax policy (e.g., adopting a formula apportionment system in the European Union or eliminating deferral in the U.S.) may be impossible without worldwide coordination. Table 1 . Columns (2) -(4) present the results of estimating on samples described in the column headings. Panel A reports the estimate of for each country/group. Panel B reports the estimate of ( + for each country/group. All available observations were included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for countries/groups having 20 or more observations. * indicates that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Results of estimating for each industry (two-digit NAICS numbers included in each group are included in parentheses) in the sample described in Column (2) of Table 2 . Panel A reports the estimate of for each country/group. Panel B reports the estimate of ( + for each country/group. Estimates are reported for country-industries with 20 or more observations. * indicates that is statistically significant at the 5% level. on a subsample of the sample described in Table  1 for which we have necessary subsidiary information. Each cell reports the estimate of for the interaction of the given parent and subsidiary variables. For example, the estimate of for the interaction term is 0.2. All interaction terms were included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for cells with 100 or more observations. 
